

**Urgent independent inquiry into public  
transport performance in Auckland for  
Rugby World Cup events on Friday  
9 September 2011**

**Dated: 22 September 2011**

**Index**

- 1 Introduction ..... 1**
  - Terms of reference for Inquiry ..... 1
- 2 Conduct of Inquiry..... 3**
- 3 Executive Summary ..... 4**
  - Introduction..... 4
  - Rail services ..... 4
  - Bus services ..... 5
  - Ferry services ..... 5
  - Ability to react as crowds increased ..... 6
  - Recommendations and conclusions..... 6
- 4 Rail services ..... 7**
  - The performance of rail services on 9 September ..... 7
- 5 Bus services ..... 10**
  - Special World Cup Arrangements for Bus Services..... 10
  - NZBus ..... 10
  - Administration and logistics ..... 11
  - Assisting Rail Services..... 11
  - Ritchies, Howick & Eastern and Bayes Coachlines..... 11
  - Ritchies ..... 11
  - Birkenhead Transport Limited (BTL) ..... 12
  - Performance of bus services on 9 September 2011 ..... 12
  - Ability of bus companies to respond to increasing numbers of people ..... 16
- 6 Ferry services..... 17**
  - Special arrangements for the Rugby World Cup ..... 17
  - Performance of the Ferry Services on 9 September ..... 17
  - Fullers’ ability to respond to increasing numbers of people ..... 19
- 7 Causes/Contributing factors..... 20**
  - Rail..... 20
  - Bus..... 22
  - Ferries..... 22
  - Common causal issues ..... 23
- 8 Steps taken to remedy problems..... 25**
  - Introduction..... 25
  - Ministry of Economic Development (Ministry) ..... 25
  - Auckland Transport and Tourism, Events and Economic Development (ATEED)..... 25
- 9 Results of implementation of remedial steps in action on Saturday 17 September ..... 27**
  - Introduction..... 27

Train Services.....	27
Buses .....	27
Ferries.....	28
Summary .....	28
<b>10 Recommendations .....</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>11 Conclusion .....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Appendices .....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>Appendix I.....</b>	<b>35</b>
(ATEED’s Issues and Action Plans) .....	35
<b>Appendix II.....</b>	<b>36</b>
(Auckland Transport’s Action Plan).....	36
<b>Appendix III .....</b>	<b>37</b>
(Action Plan including Veolia).....	37
<b>Appendix IV .....</b>	<b>38</b>
(List of rail incident reports) .....	38

# 1 Introduction

- 1.1 On Friday, 9 September 2011, the opening night of the Rugby World Cup 2011, there were a number of issues and perceived failings in public transport arrangements in Auckland.
- 1.2 On 12 September 2011 Auckland Transport engaged me to conduct an urgent, independent Inquiry into the factors leading to the perceived failings.

## Terms of reference for Inquiry

- 1.3 Auckland Transport confirmed the following terms of reference for the Inquiry:

*To enable Auckland Transport to report to the Mayor of Auckland regarding the circumstances giving rise to the perceived breakdown of public transport arrangements, with particular regard to train, ferry and bus operations for the Rugby World Cup events in Auckland on Friday, 9 September 2011....*

*In view of the importance of having available effective public transport for Rugby World Cup supporters and patrons, and considering that these events will be continuing over the next six weeks, it is important for Auckland Transport, Auckland Council, the Minister for the Rugby World Cup and the public of Auckland to have as clear an understanding as possible as to why the public transport demands during the late afternoon and evening of Friday, 9 September 2011 were not met, taking into consideration that all operations had to be conducted with safety of paramount importance. We also need to ensure that what happened on that day is not repeated.*

*As agreed, given the time constraints in finalising your report, we do not expect you to make extensive recommendations.*

- 1.4 I was directed to determine the most efficient and effective procedure, having regard to the urgency of the matter. However, due to the time constraints, there were to be no hearings, as such. I was asked to adopt an inquisitorial approach.
- 1.5 I was asked to report as a matter of urgency and agreed to do so by Friday, 16 September 2011 (Due Date).
- 1.6 Between the date of instruction and the Due Date, I was involved in a substantial investigation of documents, reports, emails and files. In addition, I interviewed a number of parties. However, as I worked towards completing my report, I continued to receive significant, additional information, almost on an hourly basis, some of which had a bearing on the findings I had made to the point that those findings then required modification. It rather quickly became apparent that if an urgent report on a complex, factual matrix were rushed, there was a very real risk that I would be reporting my Inquiry findings without necessarily having all the relevant base information from which to make accurate findings and draw appropriate conclusions.
- 1.7 I advised Auckland Transport of my concerns and we agreed that the real need for urgency was driven by a desire to identify perceived failings and ensure that they were addressed in time for future events surrounding the Rugby World Cup. Accordingly, it was agreed that my terms of reference were to be amended to produce a report generally identifying the main

issues from Friday 9 September with reference to rail, buses and ferries, analysing the causes and outlining the remedial steps that the relevant participants had agreed to take. As part of that exercise I would also examine the success or otherwise of the implementation of those remedial steps on the Rugby World Cup event on Saturday 17 September.

- 1.8 This report sets out my findings and recommendations to Auckland Transport.
- 1.9 I would like to thank all of the parties that participated in this Inquiry for their co-operation, including Auckland Transport, Auckland Council staff and the transport providers who assisted with information for my Inquiry and agreed to meet with me on short notice particularly at a time when they were under pressure preparing for future Rugby World Cup events.

## **2 Conduct of Inquiry**

- 2.1 For the purposes of conducting my Inquiry I wrote to Auckland Transport and to the relevant public transport providers requesting information relating to the provision of services for the Rugby World Cup (“RWC”) events in Auckland on 9 September 2011. I also requested meetings with those parties. I met with staff from Auckland Transport, Auckland Council, Veolia, Fullers, NZ Bus, Bayes Coachlines, Pavlovich Coachlines and Birkenhead Transport.
- 2.2 In conducting this Inquiry I was provided with a substantial number of documents, reports, emails, correspondence and minutes.
- 2.3 In view of the time constraints within which I was required to report, I have not undertaken independent verification of the information provided to me. However, where my enquiries have highlighted discrepancies in certain of the information made available, I have made reference to this in the relevant section of the report.
- 2.4 In conducting my Inquiry I adopted an inquisitorial approach.
- 2.5 In the time available for this Inquiry it was not possible to interview or request responses from public transport users. However, the information provided to me included anecdotal and other reports of feedback from public transport users.

### **3 Executive Summary**

#### **Introduction**

- 3.1 The events of Friday 9 September represented the culmination of a number of factors but the biggest, single, issue revolved around the actual numbers who attended the waterfront party and the inability to predict those numbers with any degree of accuracy. The event organisers had predicted in the week leading up to the party, that up to 50,000 may attend the waterfront celebrations. Auckland Transport then built in a 100% contingency and drew its plans based on a worst case scenario of 100,000 attending the party. As it transpires, most estimates of the final numbers who actually attended the waterfront party, are in the vicinity of twice that number.

#### **Rail services**

- 3.2 The train system was overloaded relatively early in the day, in fact by 12.30pm with passengers left on the stations. However, a series of unrelated events then interfered to slow the passage of trains on the network. At 1.44pm a report of a person on the track at Greenlane resulted in all trains being slowed for 45 minutes. In addition, the overloaded trains were running at reduced speed. Emergency brake buttons were activated by some passengers, some possibly maliciously and others simply to relieve the heat in the trains. There were also medical emergencies, various calls to emergency services, fights and assaults on board the trains and passengers or trespassers getting on the track at various locations. These all had a knock-on effect, for example when the emergency brake buttons were activated on a train at Panmure, this resulted in a 35 minute delay which of course had a knock-on delay for other trains. These extraneous events were not minor, a list of reports on these incidents appearing in Appendix 4.
- 3.3 There were significant delays and overcrowding at Britomart. These were largely a result of passengers using the rail network to come to the waterfront celebrations. They were not connected with travel arrangements to Eden Park, except to the extent that the arriving passengers disrupted those arrangements. Kiwirail reported that while fewer trains than planned were departing for Kingsland, they were in fact departing, the main constraint apparently being the failure of trains to arrive at Britomart on time. However, between 5pm and 6pm, seven of the eight planned trains delivered passengers to Kingsland, and between 6pm and 7pm, five of the nine planned trains arrived at Kingsland.
- 3.4 A crowd control plan had been instituted for Britomart Transport Centre which was primarily designed to prevent exiting passengers clashing with RWC passengers going to Eden Park. The main Britomart Transport Centre entrance was to be the entrance point for RWC passengers while the more restricted Takutai Street entrance was to be used for other passenger movements. This crowd control plan was perhaps overly complicated and relied too heavily on passengers' willingness to keep within the barriers, follow signage and heed the verbal instructions of Veolia and Auckland Transport staff. By 6.45pm, Auckland Transport security staff effectively lost control of the Takutai Square entrance because of the sheer number of people exiting the station. This in turn then affected the efficiency of passenger movement bound for the waterfront party.
- 3.5 The carriages that were not overloaded reportedly functioned adequately in terms of ventilation. However, with passengers crammed on board many trains and insufficient

security at stations and on the trains to prevent overcrowding, passengers took matters into their own hands and it would seem that a number of the emergency brake activations were motivated by a genuine desire and need for fresh air and a reduction in the temperature in the carriages.

- 3.6 Those travelling on the rail services complained about a lack of announcements at the stations and in the carriages to inform those passengers either as to reasons for the delay or the periods of delay. This all tended to heighten tension and anxiety on the trains.
- 3.7 The physical limitations of the Britomart station, and in particular its 'dead end' created capacity constraints. With a through station more frequent services could have operated by performing a dual role of both bringing passengers heading for Queens Wharf and the Viaduct into the city before heading on to Kingsland thereby avoiding the need to change trains at Britomart. It is almost certain that the levels of rail service delays experienced on 9 September would not have been so severe with a through link station.

#### **Bus services**

- 3.8 It is clear that there were significant increases in numbers carried by bus and, not surprisingly, there were some delays but also some very good examples of extraordinary flexibility with some mid afternoon services running at 500 to 600% of the normal Friday capacity. Although there were some difficulties, one of the highlights must be the various bus operators' flexibility to react as difficult circumstances arose. The flexibility, it seems, arose from the willingness of the bus operators and their drivers to add additional services and work extended hours. In particular many bus operators believed they had developed a good relationship with Auckland Transport where unanticipated heavy loading could quickly be eased by authorisation from Auckland Transport at short notice.
- 3.9 However, it appears that there was a minority of bus operators who did have capacity in their systems but were not asked to assist.

#### **Ferry services**

- 3.10 Fullers experienced difficulty manoeuvring vessels around Bayswater and the inner harbour due to congestion caused by private vessels being used to view the fireworks display.
- 3.11 There was overcrowding on some wharves but Fullers was able to utilise additional vessels, swapped vessel servicing routes to ensure that larger vessels were sent to the busier wharves and ran 40% more services than on an ordinary Friday. Fullers also arranged for Howick & Eastern buses to supply 5 buses to take passengers from Half Moon Bay into the city after the suspension of ferry services.
- 3.12 The most significant issue however was that the pedestrian access routes from the ferry terminal at Downtown Auckland (which had been protected by barriers) were overcome by the Quay Street crowd to the extent that passengers could not exit the wharf after disembarking from ferries, raising concern about the safety of the public. This resulted in a suspension of ferry services for 1 ½ hours.
- 3.13 Although there are many ferry berths at the Downtown ferry terminal the access routes to Quay Street are limited. I understand that there are no other locations in Downtown, Auckland where the passenger ferries can berth safely.



### **Ability to react as crowds increased**

- 3.14 As mentioned in paragraph 7.2, the finite capacity and inherent limitations of the rail infrastructure meant it was difficult to rectify rail problems once they developed; many of these problems arising from outside influences well beyond the control of Veolia. When the mounting passenger numbers became evident, Auckland Transport's plans to deal with the crowds within Britomart station, who were expected to arrive later, were brought forward and buses which had been on standby for a possible 4.30pm start were mobilised at 3pm to assist with excess numbers gathering at the railway stations.
- 3.15 The buses showed remarkable ability to react as numbers swelled including showing initiative to add additional services, extend the hours of their drivers and re-direct buses to problem areas without being asked or required to do so.
- 3.16 As regards the ferry services, when the access points outside the wharf on Quay Street, were overtaken by crowds, Auckland Transport suspended ferry services to Downtown, Auckland for safety reasons. Security guards and police managed to clear the access by 6pm and services were resumed. Fullers notified customers of the suspended services and arranged for buses to take passengers from Half Moon Bay to the city. Fullers also reallocated larger ferries to the busier wharves and put into service two additional vessels.

### **Recommendations and conclusions**

- 3.17 I have not repeated the last 2 sections of my report here but would recommend that sections 10 and 11 dealing with recommendations and conclusions be read as part of this Executive Summary.

## 4 Rail services

### The performance of rail services on 9 September

- 4.1 Veolia Transport Auckland Limited (**Veolia**) is contracted to Auckland Transport to provide passenger train services in Auckland.
- 4.2 The operational plans prepared by Veolia and approved by Auckland Transport required Veolia to operate the commuter train schedule to and from Britomart to the East, West and South without major disruption, as well as operating special trains to Kingsland station for the game.
- 4.3 The Auckland rail system is an open network, and Britomart is an open station, meaning that there are no permanent barriers or physical means for directing passengers to and from trains. Instead Auckland Transport staff have to rely largely on the erection of temporary barriers, sign posting and, (on the lower platform areas) the issuing of verbal instructions to passengers by Veolia on-platform staff. For the World Cup events, the arrangement was that, while the Britomart Station was under Auckland Transport's control, Veolia staff would be on the platforms and responsible for directing passengers. Auckland Transport also had its own security staff on the platforms. This was in accordance with Auckland Transport's World Cup plan for the Britomart Transport Centre.
- 4.4 Auckland Transport prepared a crowd control plan for the Britomart Transport Centre, with input from Veolia, which was primarily designed to prevent exiting passengers clashing with entering RWC passengers. The main entrance was to be the entrance point for RWC passengers while the more restricted Takutai Square entrance was to be used for all other passenger movements. While there may have been few alternatives, in some respects the crowd control plan was complex but perhaps needed to be, taking into account the design limitations of, and consent conditions for, Britomart Station (which, for fire evacuation purposes, required on-platform numbers to be limited) . It did however rely too heavily on passengers being able, or perhaps, prepared, to heed the signage and verbal instructions of Auckland Transport and Veolia staff, rather than adopting the survival tactic of the quickest and most direct route.
- 4.5 Nobody seems to have anticipated the number of partygoers who would arrive by train for the waterfront celebrations. Veolia's representatives have told me that their planning was based on Auckland Transport's specification for rail, which involved 10,000 inbound passengers to Britomart. I asked Veolia to provide some figures regarding their capacity to carry that number of passengers through the afternoon. Veolia has advised me that in the period from 2.20pm to 3.30pm it had the capacity, on the agreed normal timetables, to carry 10,000 passengers so that they arrived prior to the waka arrival at 4pm. However, this number relates to all three lines, whereas it appears that the majority of passengers were embarking on the southern line, so the above time period would need to be expanded significantly to allow for the fact that a majority of passengers were required to be transported on that line only.
- 4.6 Regardless, it appears to me that Veolia had ample capacity to transport the required 10,000 people, and that it would not have taken the entire afternoon to do it. However, Veolia's representatives were anxious to emphasise that when the timetables were put in place, (which involved consultation between Auckland Transport and Veolia), some 6-9 months ago, the specification and timing of the Fanzone activities had not been advised to them (I

understand that these had not been finally decided). There was no specification to bring 10,000 people to the city before 4pm, or indeed any change to the specification that “business as usual” services would apply to services inbound to Britomart as there was existing capacity in the system, which, based on the numbers expected to attend, was more than sufficient to cater for the greater demand predicted. This anticipated capacity was brought about by trains returning to the city following the earlier than usual “rush hour” resulting from the early office closures in the city. According to Auckland Transport’s figures, a total of 26,000 inbound passengers were carried, so there seems little doubt that the train system was in a position to cope with the specified number of 10,000. It is interesting to note that Auckland Transport based its forecasted numbers on double the normal capacity which Auckland Transport advises me was double the numbers estimated by event organisers.

- 4.7 However, it transpired that many more than 10,000 people wished to travel to Britomart on the day, and Veolia reports that the train system was overloaded by 12.30pm, with people being left on stations. The number of people arriving at Britomart from that point was far in excess of what had been anticipated. Because of the numbers being considerably higher than anticipated, Auckland Transport’s plan to exit all passengers through Takutai Square was brought forward to 3pm, even though the crowd control barriers to be set up by Auckland Transport were not then in place.
- 4.8 A number of incidents were slowing the passage of trains on the network. At 1.44pm a report of a person on the track at Greenlane resulted in all trains being slowed for 45 minutes. All trains were crammed with passengers by that point and I understand they were also running at reduced speed.
- 4.9 This situation resulted in mounting delays for the trains coming into Britomart. Kiwirail reports that by 3pm all trains arriving at Britomart were 15 minutes late, and that by 4pm all trains were 25 minutes late.
- 4.10 The Britomart station itself was coming under increasing pressure. Escalators occasionally stopped, probably through passengers hitting the stop buttons accidentally through the crowding or, intentionally, adding to the congestion on the platforms. With escalators out, people were having to use the narrow steps at the Takutai Square exit. The Britomart platforms became more and more congested as additional people arrived and fewer people were able to leave, or remained on the platforms waiting for a connection. The congestion made it difficult for passengers to exit the incoming trains, thus slowing train turnaround. Trains were also delayed because of safety concerns related to waiting passengers being pushed to the edge of the platforms.
- 4.11 The mounting delays at Britomart and on the network itself meant that trains were left stationary on the tracks for increasingly long periods, with the trains often stopped between stations. I understand from the Kiwirail report that the reason for this was that the trains needed to be advanced to signals between stations to keep progressing the movement forward. Safety rules then prevented the alighting of passengers and, therefore, the opening of doors. The trains were overloaded, and although Veolia issued instructions to staff to set air conditioning at its coldest level, inadequate ventilation and air conditioning made conditions on the trains extremely uncomfortable for the passengers. Either the ventilation was not turned to its lowest settings or it was inadequate. In addition, crowds waiting at unmanned stations and wishing to get on the already overloaded trains delayed services further. I understand from the Kiwirail report that as from 1.20pm all requests from

trains for express running (to avoid this situation) were to be declined, to reduce the risk of passengers who were unable to exit their stations operating emergency brake buttons.

- 4.12 At 4.20pm an emergency button was pressed on a train at Panmure, causing a 35 minute delay and consequent delays to other trains.
- 4.13 From about 4.30pm the situation became progressively worse, with trains queued to arrive at Britomart and consequent delays on the network. I am aware of allegations from passengers that there was no communication from Veolia staff as to what was going on. If announcements were made by Veolia staff, those announcements were not heard by passengers. With at least a perception by passengers that little or no information was being passed on to them by Veolia, passengers became frustrated and angry, pressed emergency buttons, and alighted trains between stations. The presence of people on the tracks caused all trains in the vicinity to be halted for safety reasons.
- 4.14 In regard to communications, Veolia has advised me that the rolling message signs in rail carriages (which are part of the carriage hardware and, therefore, the responsibility of Auckland Transport) are designed only to convey pre-programmed messages as the train moves past various points in the network. According to Veolia, these signs cannot be used by Veolia to convey real time information to passengers.
- 4.15 From 4.30pm those with tickets for the game became eligible for free train transport to Kingsland, putting further pressure on the rail network, particularly at Britomart.
- 4.16 Veolia advised that at 6.45pm Auckland Transport security staff at the Takutai Square entrance were unable to prevent entry by those outside the station. Veolia and Auckland Transport were unable to obtain further assistance with crowd control.
- 4.17 The effect of the delays on the rail network and the effect of some game ticket-holders leaving their departure from the waterfront too late, meant that the delivery of passengers to Kingsland occurred later than planned, and there are anecdotal reports of passengers arriving late for the opening ceremony and the game. Despite the problems encountered by Veolia, figures provided by Auckland Transport indicate that approximately 10,000 people were actually delivered to Kingsland station on the night, with a similar number being transported to Britomart after the game. In addition, Veolia was able to use the period of the opening ceremony and game to reposition trains, such that it was then able to clear all Eden Park passengers within the required 70 minutes after the match.
- 4.18 I note from the Kiwirail report that there were significant delays at Britomart post-match, and that it took until well into Saturday morning to clear the number of people wishing to return home by train. Because of the short time available to me to complete this report I have not conducted any particular investigation into the reason for these delays, but I believe I am safe in assuming that, given that an estimated 26,000 people were transported into the city by train that afternoon and evening, the delays were caused partly by the sheer number of people wishing to use the trains, and partly by the disruption to timetables which delayed trains around the network earlier in the day.
- 4.19 Veolia's view is that there was very little that it could have done differently in responding to the various incidents of delay without serious risk to the health and safety of passengers and other members of the public.

## 5 Bus services

### Special World Cup Arrangements for Bus Services

#### NZBus

- 5.1 The following is a summary of Transportation Auckland Corporation Limited's (NZ Bus) operations plan, used as an example of the operations plans that applied to the majority of the bus operators within the Auckland region during the RWC. The plan sets out the roles and responsibilities of NZBus, as well as providing detailed information on buses between the main city stop, the Civic, to Eden Park. Details include (among other things) route plans, fleet size, communication and command procedures, details of temporary bus stops and extra buses, and contingency plans.
- 5.2 The plan is incorporated into the Passenger Transport Service Agreement NZBus has with Auckland Transport by way of a variation agreement, to vary the normal services provided by NZBus.
- 5.3 The mission statement of the plan is to "provide an effective and efficient public transport [sic] to move a high number of patrons to and from competition venues in a timely and reliable manner".
- 5.4 NZBus' standard routes which would service the RWC events were to and from the central business district and Silverdale, Great North Road, Great South Road, East Tamaki and (to a lesser extent) Albany.
- 5.5 Special arrangements for the RWC included event buses from the Civic to Eden Park and back. On 9 September 2011, the first bus to depart the Civic to New North Road was scheduled for 4.30pm. 17 buses were to go to New North Road, comprising three trips, and 26 buses were scheduled to go from New North Road to the Civic, comprising two trips.
- 5.6 Buses were scheduled to depart when full or every 15 minutes, with the travel time from the Civic to New North Road estimated to be 10-15 minutes, and a travel time from New North Road to the Civic being 12-15 minutes. The operation of transporting people after the game was to be ready 30 minutes prior to the final whistle, with a maximum of ten buses to be loaded at one time.
- 5.7 Pre-departure areas were to be monitored by security guards supplied by Auckland Transport. If there were large numbers of passengers on New North Road waiting for the central business district service, then ten buses were to leave every 5-10 minutes from New North Road.
- 5.8 The estimated number of passengers to be moved in the 60 minutes following the opening match was 2,160, consisting of 52 bus trips.
- 5.9 In addition, arrangements were in place for NZBus to provide extended services from 11pm to 1am, together with an additional "night-rider" service to the outer suburbs.

### **Administration and logistics**

- 5.10 NZBus was to provide the staff required to deliver the most efficient and effective service to clear the crowd in 60 minutes post match. Auckland Transport was to arrange the personnel necessary to manage the safe and efficient loading of passengers. Two supervisors were to be based at the Civic to load buses for transporting passengers to the match.
- 5.11 Any incidents identified by drivers were to be reported to the on-ground supervisors, then to the NZBus events manager. Any incidents that may have an impact on any RWC routes were to be communicated directly to the NZBus event manager and then on to the Eden Park controller so they could advise if a contingency route were required. Contingency plans included arranging new routes, having additional supervisors based at the Civic, additional drivers to be put on standby, and maintenance being on standby.
- 5.12 If crowd numbers did exceed expectations on New North Road, then NZBus would double-stack buses at the pre-departure area.

### **Assisting Rail Services**

- 5.13 In the event of rail services being over-subscribed, Auckland Transport was to contact NZBus and request bus services to uplift passengers at Britomart. NZBus was to advise Auckland Transport what loadings were like, and what could be accommodated for rail services that would not have an impact on contracted central business district bus services.

### **Ritchies Transport Holdings Limited (Ritchies), Howick and Eastern Buses Ltd (Howick & Eastern) and Bayes Coachlines Limited (Bayes)**

- 5.14 The operations plans for Ritchies and Howick & Eastern bus companies are predominantly in the same form (although not as detailed) as that summarised above for NZBus. The Howick & Eastern operations plan does not contain provision for assisting the rail service in the event of failure or over-loading. The Ritchies operations plan does, provided all contracted obligations are first satisfied before sending assistance. I do not hold a copy of the Bayes operations plan.
- 5.15 The operations plans provide details in respect of the bus services relating to the opening ceremony and match at Eden Park. The operations plans did not allow for the very significantly increased numbers who actually visited the Viaduct/Britomart area prior to departing for Eden Park. There did appear to be an opportunity to establish a replacement bus stop close to the Britomart area, in order to alleviate the strain on the train service.

### **Ritchies**

- 5.16 Ritchies has stated that it was contracted to supply 62 dedicated buses commencing at 4pm and ensuring that the last bus arrived at Eden Park 30 minutes prior to the opening ceremony at 7pm. This comprised 50 buses from Albany to Eden Park travelling via all Northern busway stations, and 12 buses from Takapuna travelling the same route. In addition, Ritchies provided additional late night urban services along the Northern busway and from Devonport, together with 14 buses to assist Veolia's rail services on the Western Line. All are said to have been provided as promised.
- 5.17 Ritchies advises that it provided other services beyond those contracted for, including buses on the Northern Expressway, further buses to Eden Park and despatching staff to Hobson Street to manage passenger flow and assist with loading passengers.

### **Birkenhead Transport Limited (BTL)**

- 5.18 BTL is also governed by a Passenger Transport Service Agreement with Auckland Transport and this was varied so that additional “nightrider” services, being a late service operating from approximately 12pm until 4.15am, were added. Usually the service involves 1 bus per hour, however, this was increased by an extra 5-6 buses (BTL was unable to verify the number of additional routes this amounted to per hour).
- 5.19 BTL was also sub-contracted by Ritchies to provide 12 buses to transport patrons from Takapuna to Eden Park and back on the opening night. This service commenced approximately 3 hours before the match kick-off and ran until late, once all the spectators were cleared from Eden Park. BTL confirmed that this service operated without any problems.

### **Performance of bus services on 9 September 2011**

- 5.20 The following are the accounts of the bus operations on 9 September, as provided by Auckland Transport and various bus operators.
- 5.21 According to Auckland Transport, normal commuter bus services ran smoothly around the region on the morning of 9 September. Extra bus services were introduced to support the disrupted rail services. Back-up buses (31 were on stand-by) were unable to clear the entire back-log.
- 5.22 Indicative figures from Auckland Transport staff at Albany Station together with initial CCTV footage reflect that there was a delay of 1 to 1.5 hours at the peak time of 2:30pm to 4:30pm. Delays were also experienced at Mt Eden and Dominion Road station but all passengers were eventually collected.
- 5.23 Between 11.30am and 8pm bus services ran on average approximately 190% of normal capacity, peaking mid-afternoon at 500% to 600% of normal Friday capacity. The bus network, excluding Eden Park Special Event services, carried approximately 215,000 passengers compared to a normal 185,000.
- 5.24 Pre-event marketing and publicity led to reduced traffic on key arterial routes (such as Remuera Road and Great North Road) with up to a 43% travel time reduction.
- 5.25 Auckland Transport has estimated the following crowd sizes at peak times at the listed bus stations:
- |               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| Albany        | – 700 |
| Constellation | – 400 |
| Smales Farm   | – 150 |
| Akoranga      | – 100 |
| Sunnynook     | – 50  |
- 5.26 BTLran, (among other routes), its bus service from Birkenhead and Bayview on the Northshore to the central business district and back, and by 11.30am on 9 September they were starting to carry full standing loads from Verrans Corner but the normal service seemed to cope until about 1pm. At that time extra buses were added in an endeavour to cope with the influx of passengers.

- 5.27 By 2.30pm BTL's buses were only able to collect passengers from the beginning of the bus routes, as they quickly became overloaded. This continued until approximately 5pm, from which time the normal service was able to cope. With people returning from the central business district, by 7pm the same problem arose, and the bus stops after Victoria Street were unable to be serviced. This continued until 11pm when the contracted buses that serviced Eden Park returned to base.
- 5.28 BTL highlighted some of the problems encountered, such as the lack of spare buses resulting in the inability to send empty buses to clear individual bus stops, lack of crowd control, pedestrians ignoring traffic lights and pedestrians' lack of concern for their own safety. BTL noted there appeared to be a lack of Maxx Ambassadors (customer service on the ground) to help people but again this was the result of actual people numbers being so far in excess of those estimated by the event organisers.
- 5.29 BTL was not made aware of what may have been required on the 9 September and was not requested to run any extra services, outside those required for the match at Eden Park. As over 80% of bus movements are undertaken by Ritchies and NZ Bus, we understand Auckland Transport chose to deal with the larger providers who might have greater flexibility to respond within their fleets. Based on the numbers anticipated to attend the waterfront, there appeared to be more than adequate contingency cover in these arrangements. BTL did however take the initiative by putting on extra buses and staff to enable it to try and cope with the extra demand. BTL also assisted collecting passengers from Birkenhead wharf and transporting them to the city, as the Birkenhead ferry terminal was struggling to cope with demand. BTL felt it was well prepared for the RWC game at Eden Park but totally unprepared for the huge influx of people into the city as a result of opening night. BTL carried 14,676 passengers on 9 September compared to 10,524 the previous Friday.
- 5.30 BTL received one email of complaint, and other emails/phone calls being complimentary of the service provided by BTL.
- 5.31 Pavlovich Coachlines Limited (**Pavlovich**) (operating as Urban Express) was not contracted to provide any additional Eden Park event services on 9 September. The only extra capacity provided by Pavlovich was a special arrangement to transport from Customs Street to Westhaven from approximately 3pm to 12pm.
- 5.32 Pavlovich's normal service (mainly located in the Western and Southern regions such as Green Bay, Blockhouse Bay, New Lynn and Otahuhu) did experience a large increase in demand during the day but advises that it was able to cope.
- 5.33 Pavlovich's contract terms with Auckland Transport differ from the average, so for extra buses to be supplied it would need to have been fully funded by Auckland Transport. Pavlovich commented that Auckland Transport did provide ample opportunity for them to participate, however, as a result of their limited bus supply it did not seem appropriate.
- 5.34 Bayes held a contract with Auckland Transport to provide shuttles from Alexandra Park to Eden Park and back, which involved a constant flow of shuttles. There was no timetable but the service ran smoothly on 9 September. The contract was to cater for Alexandra Park Campervans for tourists going to and from Eden Park. Only 19 campers had booked at the park but on the night, 91 campers arrived. There were three buses dedicated to the contract. The trip was 15 minutes each way. The trips were spread over the afternoon but in a more compressed manner returning from the game, however, the buses coped.



Auckland Transport called regularly to monitor the performance of this contract. All the passengers were transported back to Alexandra Park after the game.

- 5.35 Auckland Transport called in Bayes to help those waiting at bus stops on the Northern Busway before the game from 2.30-3.00pm. These buses were coming from the depot at Dairy Flat, and collected passengers on the busway on the journey to the city.
- 5.36 Bayes also had a contract for rail replacement services with Veolia. This contract had been in place for some time and provides buses in case of train failures. The contract was for 25 buses in total to provide rail replacement services, with ten stationed at Britomart and 15 at Otahuhu.
- 5.37 This service was contracted to start at 4.30pm on 9 September. However, Veolia called in buses to help with excess people at railway stations from around 3.00pm, requesting buses at Newmarket and Sylvia Park stations. Veolia asked Bayes to mobilise whatever buses were available. Once the call was received from Veolia, three buses went to the Newmarket station immediately to collect passengers from the bus stop outside the train station. As a result of the request from Veolia, buses were sent to a number of locations in Auckland to support the train services. These locations included Otahuhu, Panmure, Orakei and Ellerslie. They were sent to every train station. Approximately 20 buses went to the city centre after completing school run services. In Bayes' view, the services supporting Veolia prior to the game went well and people were cleared from the train stations.
- 5.38 Twenty minutes into the opening ceremony (at 8.08pm) a call was received to send all buses to Market Road station as a train had broken down. However, when the bus arrived at around 8.20pm there were very few people there, and only two half loads were taken; half to Eden Park and half to Britomart. A call was also received to go to Customs Street at the same time. However, at that stage there were no passengers at Customs Street. Accordingly, Bayes buses remained on standby until 11.30pm.
- 5.39 At 9.30pm Veolia contacted Bayes requesting services to take passengers home from the central business district, to all locations in Auckland. The pick up point for the rail replacement services was the corner of Commerce and Gore Streets in the city. This area was saturated with people. All 25 buses went to this location which was pre-arranged with Veolia. The buses could not enter Customs and Gore Streets. There were no conductors on the buses (as there ordinarily would be with rail replacement services) as the conductors were on the trains. Because of the large crowds it was extremely difficult for buses to enter or exit the area.
- 5.40 Passengers were taken to all locations in Auckland, following the routes to the train stations and the last bus back to the Bayes depot was at 3.00am.
- 5.41 Veolia had originally sought more than 25 buses to be available for their rail replacement contract but this was the maximum Bayes had available. Bayes had no spare buses sitting idle that night.
- 5.42 Drivers are only permitted in New Zealand to work 14 hour days. An exemption is available to extend to 17 hours in extraordinary circumstances, which enabled bus drivers to work to 11.30pm that night. In response to a request from Veolia to keep working, Auckland Transport (Greg Hall) "opened the variation of hours letter" authorising bus drivers to work beyond their hours. They carried on until 3.00am in the morning.

- 5.43 In Bayes' view, a major problem was crowd control at the waterfront or rather the lack thereof. Bayes had no communication issues with Veolia in relation to their contract.
- 5.44 NZBus, in conjunction with Auckland Transport, implemented a new automated ticket service and smart card system to its entire Auckland fleet, to help improve its service for the event.
- 5.45 NZBus stated that from 2pm at the Civic there was an increase in passenger numbers, with the buses provided being full, however, the operation went well without any major incidents. A total of 2,750 passengers were recorded by NZBus at the Civic.
- 5.46 At approximately 7pm, Bond Street was overloaded by a large crowd on the fan trail, causing the Major Events Operations Centre (MEOC), operating from Britomart, to close Bond Street to traffic and implement a contingency route.
- 5.47 Bond Street reopened after approximately 30 minutes and buses returned to the original location. Barriers were rushed back to their original positions, although there were only 2 security guards left to assist.
- 5.48 Further bus trips cleared passengers within 65 minutes after the game had finished, which was within expectations. Approximately 3000 passengers were recorded by ground staff, giving a total of 5,750 passengers recorded on midtown shuttles.
- 5.49 Albany was noted as being one of, if not the, major bus station with crowding issues. After discussions with the MEOC it was decided that passengers would be allowed to board the non-NZ bus services in Albany free of charge from approximately 3.30pm. This was done to help quicken the service, and to try and ease the tension evident by the frustration of passengers not being able to obtain transport.
- 5.50 Outside Britomart, there was also considerable crowd pressure on the Northern busway and Great North Road stops but these were manageable.
- 5.51 NZBus had good lines of communication with MEOC, which resulted in certain bus drivers beginning their shifts early, and the provision of extra buses or the diversion of buses, where it was possible. The arrangement with MEOC is flexible, allowing NZBus to make a commercial decision when problem areas were identified. However, at no time was NZBus requested by MEOC to assist with trying to alleviate the overloaded train stations.
- 5.52 Scheduled services in the inner city were impacted by the significant changes required to accommodate the closure of Quay Street and Britomart, which required all Metrolink and Go West services to be relocated.
- 5.53 On average, NZBus carries 122,000 passengers every Friday. On 9 September NZBus carried in excess of 156,000 passengers, an increase of 34,000 (28%).
- 5.54 Ritchies' service routes in Auckland include Albany, Long Bay, Glenfield and certain Western Suburbs. Ritchies was advised by a driver at 10.50am that the Northern busway service was heavy, and assistance was necessary. Further buses were provided for the Northern busway, starting at 11.34am. Once additional buses and drivers became available from other duties, they were added to the Northern busway service. Between 11.30am and 5pm, 64 additional trips to the normal timetable were made on the Northern busway, with approximately 5,675 additional passengers carried during that period.

- 5.55 We spoke by telephone with Ritchies' depot manager for Albany station, Lyn Carter (with Ritchies' solicitor who was party to the discussion), who stated that (together with confirming the figures mentioned above) approximately 15 drivers were added to the transport operation, once they had become available from other commitments. Lyn Carter confirmed that Ritchies received calls from Auckland Transport requesting additional buses.
- 5.56 She further reported that by 4pm it was the largest group of passengers she had witnessed at Albany station but the passengers were able to be cleared within a wait time of approximately 45 minutes. This differs from the Auckland Transport estimate of delays between 1 and 1½ hours. She also stated that the 2 main city stops, Hobson Street and Victoria Park, were extremely busy returning passengers from the city to the North Shore. At peak times Ritchies was needing to alternate empty buses between the 2 stations to ensure they were both being serviced as the buses were filling immediately.
- 5.57 Westlake Girls High School (2,159 pupils) closed at 12 noon, which meant that Smales Farm Station was heavy but Ritchies coped. Ritchies was not informed that the school was to finish early.
- 5.58 Auckland Transport requested additional buses and these were provided by Ritchies. Between 8.30pm and 12 midnight an additional 76 trips above the normal timetable had been undertaken amounting to approximately 7,500 passengers.
- 5.59 Ritchies advises that its service along the Northern busway worked well, without incident.
- 5.60 Ritchies commented that while it was able to send 23 buses to the Britomart station, to assist with the train overloading, only 5 bus loads of passengers were able to be transported to Eden Park. Ritchies believes the reason for this is that there were no people available to direct the passengers onto the buses. A further reason seems to be that the sheer volume of people in the vicinity made it difficult to actually find and get to the buses.

#### **Ability of bus companies to respond to increasing numbers of people**

- 5.61 As with the other public transport operators, the bus companies anticipated an increase in numbers, however, such increase was substantially underestimated by the event organisers. It is also evident that the majority of the bus operators used remarkable initiative to add additional services, extend the hours of their drivers, and re-direct buses to problem areas without being asked or required to do so.

## **6 Ferry services**

### **Special arrangements for the Rugby World Cup**

- 6.1 I have been provided with a copy of a letter dated 19 August 2011 from Auckland Transport to Fullers Group Limited (**Fullers**) which records the confirmed arrangements for the provision of additional sailings for the Birkenhead/Northcote Point, Bayswater and Half Moon Bay ferry services during the World Cup.
- 6.2 The letter records that these sailings were not to be treated as variations under the main contracts. Attached to this letter is a schedule of additional sailings for all Auckland match days throughout the Rugby World Cup. There were four additional sailings scheduled for 9 September 2011, departing from the ferry terminal in the late evening (from 11.30 pm to 1.30 am).
- 6.3 In addition, when Fullers identified that it would have some capacity on other vessels available on the day of the opening ceremony, it offered in an email to Auckland Transport dated 7 September 2011 to make available two additional ferry services. This offer was made on the basis that a decision could be made on the day if demand exceeded the contracted supply to cater for the various events scheduled on Friday 9 September. I understand this offer was verbally accepted by Auckland Transport on 8 September.

### **Performance of the Ferry Services on 9 September**

- 6.4 Fullers provided me with a detailed breakdown as to the operation of ferry services in Auckland on the afternoon and evening of 9 September.
- 6.5 On 25 August 2011, Fullers was advised by Auckland Transport of the waka ceremony and fireworks display planned for the inner ferry basin. On 29 August 2011 a decision was made to suspend Fullers' usual ferry services for approximately 25 minutes (from 7:50 pm to 8:15 pm) to the ferry terminal while the waka ceremony and fireworks took place. Consequently, Fullers adjusted its ferry timetables. Anticipating that delays would occur as a result of the suspension of services, Fullers communicated this to the public through print media, its website and by means of signage in the days leading up to the event.
- 6.6 Fullers had attempted to estimate likely numbers of passengers travelling on 9 September by surveying passengers (including on its website). However, Fullers received very little response from passengers and had little information regarding likely demand for ferry services on 9 September prior to concluding arrangement for additional services with Auckland Transport in August 2011.
- 6.7 Auckland Transport made an on-site visit to the ferry terminal on 22 August 2011 to discuss arrangements for fencing and security and Fullers raised questions at that time about crowd control and the flow of passengers on opening night. On 6 September Fullers walked through the wharf area with Auckland Transport to determine the positioning of fencing and security for opening day, which was to be supplied by Auckland Transport.
- 6.8 Security on the wharves was to be supplied by Auckland Transport. Fullers met with First Security on 8 September to finalise requirements for security on board their vessels and at the wharves for the following day.

- 6.9 Fullers arranged to have extra staff at all wharves as well as additional communications, ticketing and power outage and cash back-up solutions for all departure points.
- 6.10 From 1.00 pm on 9 September Fullers began to notice a large increase in passenger numbers. By 2.00 pm Devonport wharf was full. Fullers also began to experience difficulty manoeuvring vessels around Bayswater and the inner harbour due to congestion caused by private vessels. Vessels travelling into the city began travelling at full capacity and crowds started accumulating on wharves with passengers waiting to travel into the city. It became difficult at some wharves to separate pre-paid ticket holding passengers from the other passengers.
- 6.11 It has been reported that some large double-sided screens located on Quay Street at the bottom of Albert Street and adjacent to the Ferry Terminal, failed. Resulting crowds, moved to the Ferry Terminal side of screens to watch the celebrations, thereby increasing the crowd numbers close to the Ferry Terminal.
- 6.12 Fullers has stated that the barriers at the wharf were made of wire mesh with concrete bases. It seems that the sheer pressure of numbers resulted in the barriers being pushed to one side to the extent that the access points were overrun by the Quay Street crowds so that passengers could not exit the area after disembarking from ferries, causing public safety concerns.
- 6.13 At 4:15 pm Fullers spoke with Auckland Transport representatives regarding crowd congestion flowing back onto the wharves at the Ferry Terminal. Shortly after 4:30pm Auckland Transport decided to suspend ferry services coming into the Ferry Terminal, for safety reasons. Security guards were then supplemented by police to manage the crowds at the wharf.
- 6.14 Fullers advised customers waiting at the various wharves of the suspended services. Fullers contacted Howick and Eastern buses and arranged for 5 buses to take passengers from Half Moon Bay into the city.
- 6.15 The ferry services were suspended for approximately one and a half hours, forcing around 2000 passengers to find other means of access into the City.
- 6.16 By 6.00 pm Police were able to control the crowds at the Waterfront and ferry services resumed both inbound and outbound from the city. There was a large exodus to the North Shore from then until 7:30 pm.
- 6.17 After dark, Fullers' vessels experienced serious navigation problems due to the numbers of spectator craft in the harbour by Queens Wharf to view the fireworks as well as significant private vessel traffic on return journeys to Waiheke and Half Moon Bay.
- 6.18 Fullers states that the ferries were able to resume normal operations in accordance with the scheduled timetable by approximately 10.00 pm.
- 6.19 The number of passengers transported by Fullers' ferries on 9 September was approximately 30,500.
- 6.20 On an average Friday the total number of passengers carried is 13,909 but on 9 September Fullers experienced a 119% increase in the number of passengers carried and ran an extra 52 services, equating to a total of 104 trips.

- 6.21 In order to meet the increasing numbers of passengers, Fullers utilised additional vessels, changed the vessels servicing the routes to ensure that larger vessels were sent to busier wharves and added a significant number of additional runs (40% more than on a normal Friday).
- 6.22 Fullers states that it had no discussions with Auckland Transport about anticipated numbers of passengers prior to 9 September but was aware of the estimated number of 50,000 partygoers.
- 6.23 Fullers considered that it coped well given the circumstances. The longest waiting times were up to 45 minutes at Devonport wharf and one hour at Half Moon Bay, other than when services were suspended. Fullers believes it would have been able to clear all backlogs of passengers had there been available capacity for more people in Downtown Auckland and if services had continued without suspension.

#### **Fullers' ability to respond to increasing numbers of people**

- 6.24 Fullers had anticipated a greater than usual demand for services on 9 September, although it was not working to any estimate as to likely numbers of ferry passengers. Fullers had employed additional staff, security and resources, and had available two additional ferries, pursuant to arrangements agreed with Auckland Transport on 8 September. The actual number of passengers who used or attempted to use ferry services into and out of the city on 9 September exceeded the increase in numbers that Fullers had anticipated. However, Fullers believes that it could have carried the number of passengers who attempted to use ferry services on 9 September, had services not been suspended.
- 6.25 When the increasing number of passengers became evident in the afternoon, Fullers reallocated its vessels to ensure that larger ferries with greater capacity were directed where possible to the wharves where larger numbers of passengers were waiting. Fullers was therefore able at least to minimise the impact at those wharves. However, good, advanced, communication by Fullers to its passengers to expect lengthy waits appears to have lessened the impact of delays.
- 6.26 Fullers also responded to the unexpected suspension of services by promptly advising passengers to find another means of transport into the city and by arranging buses to transport passengers from Half Moon Bay.

## 7 Causes/Contributing factors

### Rail

- 7.1 It appears that the principal factor that contributed to the delays experienced by rail services was the underestimation by event organisers as to the number of people likely to attend the waterfront party.
- 7.2 The finite capacity and inherent limitations of the rail infrastructure meant it was difficult to rectify rail problems once they developed; many of these problems arising from outside influences well beyond the control of Veolia.
- 7.3 The prospect of a highly entertaining party on the Auckland waterfront, combined with widespread promotion of public transport as the best way to get to the game, led many ticket-holders to opt for train travel into central Auckland for the waterfront celebrations, with the intention of some then to proceed by train from Britomart to Eden Park for the opening ceremony. While the promotions did not specifically encourage public transport to the waterfront party, there is no doubt that public transport informative marketing resulted in thousands of others using the train system simply to get to the party. In addition many central business district businesses were encouraged to close early, resulting in a large number of city workers massing in the Quay Street area and many others travelling home by car and then taking public transport back into the city for the celebrations, thereby further increasing the numbers utilising public transport.
- 7.4 Significantly, the problems experienced at Britomart were largely a result of passengers using the rail network to come to the waterfront celebrations. They were not connected with travel arrangements to Eden Park, except to the extent that the arrival of so many passengers disrupted those arrangements. Kiwirail reported that while fewer trains than planned were departing for Kingsland, they were in fact departing, the main constraint apparently being the failure of trains to arrive at Britomart on time (bearing in mind that some of these same trains would have been required for the Kingsland service). For example, between 5.30pm and 6.30pm Kiwirail reports that there were only 6 of 14 planned arrivals at Britomart. However, between 5pm and 6pm, 7 of the 8 planned trains delivered passengers to Kingsland, and between 6pm and 7pm, 5 of the 9 planned trains arrived at Kingsland.
- 7.5 The carriages that were not overloaded reportedly functioned adequately in terms of ventilation. However, with passengers crammed on board many trains and insufficient security at stations and on trains to prevent overcrowding on carriages, passengers took matters into their own hands and it would seem that a number of the emergency brake activations were motivated by a genuine desire and need for fresh air and a reduction in the temperature in the carriages.
- 7.6 Those travelling on the rail services complained about a lack of announcements at the stations and in the carriages to inform those passengers either as to reasons for the delay or the periods of delay. This all tended to heighten tension and anxiety on the trains.
- 7.7 Veolia's representatives told me that, given sufficient notice and a request to do so, they could have treated the waterfront celebrations as a special event and made the necessary arrangements for that, in addition to the arrangements made for the game at Eden Park, (however, with all the trains available being fully utilised it would surely still have been a

challenge). Instead, Veolia's brief from Auckland Transport was to run normal services to and from Britomart Transport Centre on the day and additional services to Eden Park. As I understand it, no special arrangements were made for inbound services, and no extra staff were deployed either on board the trains or at stations. I emphasise however that the decision to run normal services into the city was based on an expectation by Auckland Transport that there would be additional capacity on trains brought about by largely empty trains returning to the city following the earlier than usual 'rush hour'. That is, additional services were not anticipated as being required as there was sufficient spare capacity to cope with the expected numbers. As it transpired, the lack of capacity was brought about by an underestimate of the numbers expected to attend the waterfront celebrations by event organisers, including the numbers expected to travel to the celebrations by train – on the southern line in particular.

- 7.8 It is clear that Veolia's operating plans (approved by Auckland Transport) for 9 September did not anticipate the enormous influx of people into the city to participate in the waterfront activities planned for the RWC opening ceremony. However, it appears that there was little that could have been done differently by Auckland Transport or Veolia to accommodate passenger demand that was so far in excess of the finite capacity of the rail infrastructure, without delays. The operating plans focused principally on the transport of people from the central business district and other destinations to the rugby game at Eden Park. Unfortunately, it seems that many people planned to go first to the Auckland waterfront and then on to the game, and it made sense for them to take the train in both cases (it was free to ticket holders, after all). This led to unprecedented congestion outside the Britomart Transport Centre from partygoers which added to the difficulty of passengers making their way to Britomart. Crowd control outside Britomart by the event organisers was clearly inadequate for the numbers that eventually attended. The crowd control measures planned by Auckland Transport with input from Veolia for Britomart station itself eventually broke down, and by 6.45pm the station was virtually paralysed by the extreme pressure from the sheer weight of numbers.
- 7.9 Thus the breakdown of train transport plans on 9 September was attributable to a number of factors:
- (a) Underestimation by the event organisers as to the number of people likely to take part in the waterfront celebrations by the event organisers and an apparent failure to anticipate that many of these people would use public transport to get there, particularly trains;
  - (b) Auckland Transport's carriages having inadequate ventilation (the windows cannot be opened on the older carriages) and communication facilities;
  - (c) Poor communication with passengers (announcements were either not made by Veolia staff or, if they were made, they were not heard by passengers), leading people to take matters into their own hands;
  - (d) Issues with intoxication and anti-social behaviour;
  - (e) A high number of incidents presenting health and safety risks, which Veolia had to deal with as a priority, in order to avoid fatalities and injuries.



I note that with the exception of (c) above, none of these factors is a direct responsibility of Veolia. However it is the operator's responsibility to act proactively when faced with any difficult situation.

- 7.10 The physical limitations of the Britomart station, and in particular its 'dead end' created capacity constraints. With a through station more frequent services could have operated by performing a dual role of both bringing passengers heading for Queens Wharf and the Viaduct into the city before heading on to Kingsland thereby avoiding the need to change trains at Britomart. It is almost certain that the levels of rail service delays experienced on 9 September would not have been so severe had the Britomart Transport Centre been a "through link" station.

#### **Bus**

- 7.11 While there is provision (although limited) within the operations plans for the bus operators to assist the train service, it appears there may have been a lack of communication from Auckland Transport with a minority of bus operators, by not requesting assistance for overloading on trains stations and in the Britomart area. Auckland Transport had deliberately put in place contingency arrangements only with the larger operators because of the flexibility within their fleets, and based on the numbers predicted by event organisers, there was sufficient capacity within those larger companies.
- 7.12 BTL believes that the number of buses servicing the North Shore was inadequate. With no train service linking the North Shore with either the central business district or Eden Park and most people living on the North Shore and wanting to use public transport, they had no other option but to use the bus service. Again, based on the estimated numbers of people expected to attend the waterfront celebrations, there would have been sufficient capacity. This problem would have been further exacerbated by the Ferries being unable to unload for a limited period at the ferry terminal in Downtown, Auckland.
- 7.13 There were comments from some bus operators that there were inadequate numbers of Maxx Ambassadors on the ground to assist with public enquiries, and to help direct passengers to the correct bus stops. A further reason seems to be that the sheer volume of people in the vicinity made it difficult to find and get to the busses.
- 7.14 In addition, many schools and work places finished early on 9 September without the bus companies having been notified, which resulted in certain bus stops being crowded at unusual times well before those wishing to travel to the opening ceremony arrived.

#### **Ferries**

- 7.15 As has been indicated in respect of other public transport services, a number of factors contributed to the problems experienced with ferry transport in Auckland on 9 September 2011. These factors appear to include:
- (a) The location and subsequent breakdown of some of the large screens on Quay Street causing crowd congestion to reach serious levels in the vicinity of the Ferry Terminal;
  - (b) The location of the waterfront celebrations, with inadequate modes of exit for building crowds in a centralised area bordered by the harbour;
  - (c) Late notice to the ferry services of the activities planned in the inner harbour; and

- (d) The number of leisure craft that congregated in the harbour and travelled to and from the city for the opening ceremony was not anticipated.

### **Common causal issues**

7.16 In addition, in my opinion there are a number of causal factors which were common to all three operating sectors:

- (a) Widespread promotion of, and information with respect to, public transport and mass take-up of public transport (including the promise of free transport);
- (b) The underestimation by event organisers as to the number of people who were likely to attend the opening ceremony celebrations at the waterfront and as to the number likely to use public transport to get to the waterfront. The event organisers anticipated numbers attending as 30,000 to 50,000 people. Auckland Transport, in completing its calculations, did so on the basis of the event organisers' estimates but had, in its own planning, a 100% contingency by preparing for a potential waterfront crowd of 100,000 people. It was confident that these numbers could be catered for with the mixed allocation of transport options;
- (c) Inadequate crowd control by event organisers (outside Britomart Transport Centre for the trains, at Quay Street for the ferries, and Customs and Gore Streets for the buses);
- (d) The fact that the opening celebrations were held on a working day rather than a weekend, which meant that a reasonable proportion of the capacity in the public transport system had already been taken up by commuters and school children; on a weekend there would have been greater capacity by default;
- (e) Strangely enough, the weather was probably a very significant factor. Friday 9 September was a stunningly, beautiful spring day with clear skies, slightly warmer weather and glassy conditions on the harbour which made the prospect of a party on the waterfront enormously appealing. It seems that people made spontaneous decisions to attend the waterfront which no amount of forward planning could predict;
- (f) Poor communications with passengers as to the timing and reasons for delay on the trains and to a lesser extent at bus stations, contributed to the way people responded to the delays;
- (g) The offer of free travel to Rugby World Cup ticket holders limited to the three hour period prior to the opening ceremony had the unintended affect of concentrating public transport travel to a confined period (although this offer did not extend to the ferries);
- (h) There was a very genuine sense of excitement which had built up surrounding the commencement of the Rugby World Cup tournament and a desire by many people to show their support. As the afternoon progressed, the level of excitement and anticipation grew along with the building crowds;
- (i) The Auckland waterfront on 9 September was a true destination for Aucklanders and those supporters here for the Rugby World Cup tournament as it was the focal point for a wonderful range of entertainment - the arrival of the wakas, the live bands,

fireworks and the prospect of the best party Auckland had ever seen. The party excelled its billing and the city was to a certain extent, the victim of its own success.

## **8 Steps taken to remedy problems**

### **Introduction**

- 8.1 Following the events of Friday 9 September, it is apparent that the numbers of people attending the celebrations on that night were extraordinary and unlikely to be repeated. However, a number of initiatives have been agreed with a view to rectifying the issues identified in this report, and these are set out below.

### **Ministry of Economic Development (Ministry)**

- 8.2 I have been provided with documentation in respect of the urgent approval of an application to extend the Queens Wharf Fanzone to Captain Cook Wharf. The documentation includes the recommendation of the Rugby World Cup Authority (RWCA) and a copy of the Urgent Approval issued by the Minister for the Rugby World Cup (Minister).
- 8.3 The RWCA's recommendation was in response to an application prepared by Blakey Scott Planning Limited on behalf of the Ministry. The recommendation considered the reasons for the extension set out in the application, including whether the application complied with the criteria set out in the Rugby World Cup 2011 (Empowering) Act 2010 (Act). The recommendation quoted the purpose of Part 4 of the Act, being, in part, "to make provision for special procedures to apply in circumstances of urgency that, for good reason, were not foreseen."
- 8.4 In brief, the recommendation approved the extension of the Fanzone to Captain Cook Wharf, on essentially the same conditions as the original approval for Queens Wharf, subject to amendments suggested by the Auckland Council, (in its capacity as administrative secretariat for the RWCA), to the plans for Queens Wharf to take account of the extended activity on Captain Cook Wharf, including the lighting plan, the transport management plan, fire design and operations plan.
- 8.5 The Ministry's application was received by the Council as Administrative Secretariat for the RWCA on the morning of 14 September 2011, and was then posted on the RWCA's website. The RWCA invited submissions on the application by 6pm 14 September 2011. Four submissions were received, only one in opposition (Wilson Parking), which was later withdrawn. A hearing was held by the RWCA at 2pm on 15 September, and the RWCA issued its recommendation the same day.
- 8.6 The Minister's approval was granted the next day, 16 September, at 9.50am thereby extending the Queens Wharf Fanzone to Captain Cook Wharf.

### **Auckland Transport and Tourism, Events and Economic Development (ATEED)**

- 8.7 ATEED's post-event review identified a number of issues and an action plan, a copy of which is set out in Appendix I.
- 8.8 In summary, the issues identified by ATEED revolved around the failure of the two big screens and the consequent pushing of the crowds to the west, the impact of the party on ferry terminal operations, the sheer number of people in Quay Street and provision of porta-loos and rubbish receptacles. The action plans are set out in Appendix I. It should be

noted that, as set out in paragraph 8.7 above the Queens Wharf Fanzone has now been extended to include Captain Cook Wharf.

### **Auckland Transport**

- 8.9 Auckland Transport similarly undertook a review of transport and traffic management during the weekend of September 9 – 11. That report focused on risk management and forward actions in anticipation of Rugby World Cup activities unfolding in the region in the weeks ahead. The report included a list of actions to be implemented, which appears in Appendix II.
- 8.10 The actions to be implemented for future matches focused around six main issues:
- (a) Use of the emergency stop buttons on the trains;
  - (b) Security, safety and prevention of overcrowding on trains;
  - (c) Communications on trains;
  - (d) On-board environment on trains;
  - (e) Operational contingency response management; and
  - (f) Bus services.
- 8.11 As these matters are mentioned in some detail in Appendix II, I will not repeat them here.

### **Rail Services - Veolia**

- 8.12 Following 9 September, Auckland Transport identified, in conjunction with Veolia, a number of areas requiring further attention and agreed a list of suggested short and long term remedies. That action list appears in Appendix III, the majority of items being Veolia's responsibility. The "lead", indicates the party responsible for taking the agreed actions (being Auckland Transport unless indicated otherwise). I am advised by Veolia that the allocation of responsibility follows the current responsibilities of the respective parties (for example Auckland Transport is responsible for the station management and Veolia responsible for rail service delivery). Veolia advised me that all the agreed actions which are the responsibility of Veolia have been undertaken.
- 8.13 There have been no material changes to the core train operating plan. Most of the agreed changes focused on providing additional resources for on-board communications and security (mainly at the stations).

## **9 Results of implementation of remedial steps in action on Saturday 17 September**

### **Introduction**

- 9.1 I have spoken to representatives from Auckland Transport and obtained a “match day report” in respect to the effectiveness of public transport surrounding the operation of the Fanzone in Downtown Auckland and the Australia v Ireland match at Eden Park on Saturday 17 September.

### **Train Services**

- 9.2 The train services were well patronised with numbers accelerating in the early afternoon but with passengers seated and no evidence of overcrowding. Approximately 1,800 passengers were taken directly from the south to Eden Park and a further 1,200 passengers from the west to Eden Park. The service from Britomart to Eden Park moved 8,370 passengers. The total number of passengers who travelled by rail to Eden Park was 11,370. In respect of the return journey, Morningside and Kingsland platforms were cleared within 60 minutes against a KPI of 70 minutes.
- 9.3 The number of people transported to and from Eden Park was well within Auckland Transport’s planning which had allowed for 2,500 passengers to be moved from the south directly to Eden Park, 2,500 passengers from the west to Eden Park and 12,500 from the City to Eden Park.
- 9.4 Veolia advises that it conducted a full de-brief with its staff on Monday 19 September, to identify any areas for further improvement. The results of that de-brief have been discussed with Auckland Transport which we understand is normal operational practice. The result was that only minor changes were required to be made to the agreed operational plans for the weekend of 24 September involving matters such as buses being deployed slightly differently to reflect the different demographics of the Eden Park crowd anticipated this weekend.

### **Buses**

- 9.5 Auckland Transport arranged an extra service run from Britomart to Eden Park adjacent to the station, which transported approximately 3,400 people. 100 buses were available but only approximately 50 were used undertaking 90 trips. Each bus was approximately half full. This amounted to around 25% of the capacity available. Most passengers were seated but the numbers were probably 10% less than expected when looking at the combined bus and rail total. This bus service had been arranged to alleviate pressure on the rail network.
- 9.6 In respect of other bus services, these were considered to have operated at close to the passenger levels expected. However, the allocation of buses for future matches will still need to take into account the differing demographics of the nations playing at Eden Park. For example, for the Fiji/Samoa match on Sunday 25 September, Auckland Transport will double the number of buses available coming from the south.

- 9.7 On the weekend of 17/18 September, Auckland Transport had arranged for 74 buses to be on standby and these were dotted around the transport network in case of a rail breakdown. For the weekend of 24/25 September there will be a greater concentration of rail standby buses located around the southern line.
- 9.8 Auckland Transport still had some concerns in respect of the bus service operating from the Britomart bus hub where there was overcrowding in the area. It is intended to alter the layout and type of barrier used prior to the weekend of 24 September.

#### **Ferries**

- 9.9 Auckland Transport advised that additional ferry services were arranged for the West Harbour, Pine Harbour, Bayswater, Birkenhead, Half Moon Bay and Waiheke runs. All operated late night services. The ferries are reported to have run comfortably with all passengers on the wharves collected and the boats running within their capacity.

#### **Summary**

- 9.10 It appears that on Saturday 17 September the public transport services operated generally as anticipated. The crowds were roughly in line with expectations although the movement in the crowd was probably a little earlier than anticipated. A total 37,000 individuals went through the gates in the Fanzone but by 4:30pm, numbers had started reducing substantially as passengers moved to the game. During the game there were approximately 59,000 people at Eden Park and 6,000 at the Fanzone, numbers which the public transport system was able to cope with relatively easily. However, if a crowd of 200,000 people was repeated there is a real risk that this would overload the public transport system once again. Accordingly, the need to manage the number of people at the waterfront is addressed in paragraph 10.3.

## 10 Recommendations

- 10.1 I am not a traffic planner or traffic engineer, so my comments below reflect the views, not of an expert, but of an independent observer who has reviewed an extensive range of documents and interviewed most of the key providers of transport services for the RWC events.
- 10.2 The number of recommendations which I have made is significantly shorter than might have been the case immediately following the events of Friday 9 September due to the fact that Auckland Transport and its providers have, since that date, instituted a significant number of changes.
- 10.3 The sheer difficulty in predicting the number of people likely to attend the waterfront celebrations with any degree of accuracy took everyone by surprise on Friday 9 September. A rather obvious recommendation is that greater accuracy is required and while I appreciate that this is not, and cannot be, an exact science, there need to be safeguards to ensure that the number of passengers does not exceed the capacity of the Auckland public transport system. While it is not an attractive option, limiting numbers by temporary security screens to the Downtown party and entry by pre-purchased free tickets, would provide some control over numbers attending and also enable a more accurate prediction of people numbers at the waterfront.
- 10.4 It seems there was a fundamental breakdown between management of the waterfront celebrations and publicity for the event. Accordingly, there needs to be a greater element of management and control around the numbers attending.
- 10.5 One of the factors which did have an impact on 9 September was holding the events on a working day, which meant that a reasonable proportion of the capacity in the public transport system was already taken by commuters and school children. If Friday 9 September had been a public holiday or scheduled as a "teacher-only" day, considerably more capacity would have been available on the trains, buses and ferries. While it is obviously not always possible, events held on weekends will allow use of greater, excess capacity.
- 10.6 To assist with water traffic management, consideration could be given to limiting the number of leisure craft in the harbour while large events are taking place on the waterfront.
- 10.7 The use of walking routes "fan trails" from Downtown Auckland to Eden Park has been described to me as a wonderful experience, friendly, fun and a festival atmosphere. Although these were well promoted, there is potential to share these good experiences with the public and encourage even greater use for future events.
- 10.8 One measure that has the potential to reduce delays significantly on the rail network for special event services is limiting the number of passengers boarding trains, thereby avoiding the various problems caused by overcrowding, including uncomfortable conditions for passengers and reducing the likelihood of passengers pushing emergency stop buttons.
- 10.9 This measure is being implemented for future Rugby World Cup events. Auckland Transport aims to reduce the number of people on each carriage (to numbers below capacity). I understand that there will be additional security staff on the platforms at Britomart, Kingsland and Morningside stations to limit the number of people entering the rail platform.



In addition, at these stations there will be additional Veolia staff on the platforms positioned at the doors of the trains to manage passengers getting on and off trains. I endorse those measures.

- 10.10 With other stations throughout Auckland's rail network, there is not a proposal at this stage to limit the number of people accessing the rail platforms. This would be difficult with Auckland's open network as stations have between two and six paths leading to the station and do not have gates which can be closed. To limit access to these stations (and, thereby, the platforms) would require around 10 to 12 security staff at each station (two for each entrance) and possibly the erection of barriers.
- 10.11 At this stage Auckland Transport proposes to manage overcrowding at stations by means of CCTV cameras (to monitor numbers of passengers) and security guards on the platforms. I understand that those security guards will monitor the number of passengers waiting at the stations and will advise passengers when trains are full and that buses are available to transport them. There will be a number of buses waiting at some stations within the network to transport passengers in order to avoid crowds building at stations and passengers waiting for trains. In addition, some temporary barriers will be available, which can be erected by security guards if necessary.
- 10.12 I understand that Auckland Transport is considering limiting access to key stations within the network for the later games within the tournament. While it does not seem feasible to do this in respect of all stations, it would seem that a contingency plan should be put in place (including sufficient security staffing) to enable implementation of this measure for the key stations where passengers are expected to access the rail network for the quarter, semi-final and final games.
- 10.13 I understand that most, if not all trains have 'moving message' signs but they are not capable of being used to transmit real time information and accordingly updates on reasons for, and periods of, delay cannot be communicated using the existing equipment. However, where audibility is an issue, ensuring moving signs are in clear positions where they can be seen and upgraded with a capability to produce relevant updates, would greatly assist.
- 10.14 The events of 9 September have demonstrated that the emergency brake system on Auckland Transport's rail carriages has the potential to create lengthy delays for the rail system as the driver is required to move through crowded carriages to locate the button that has been activated, re-set the emergency button and the air tanks for the brakes must be re-compressed. If a train is stopped between stations and passengers climb down to the tracks, this creates further delays as trains in the vicinity must be halted for safety reasons.
- 10.15 It appears that a major potential disruption to special event rail services could be mitigated by the adoption of a different emergency alarm system on rail carriages. In modern trains, including those due to be commissioned in Auckland in the future, I understand that an alarm can be activated by passengers in the carriages, which is communicated to the driver. The driver has a camera/video screen in his or her cab and can then make a decision whether to proceed with the journey (in the case of a false alarm) or stop the train and inspect (if the screen reveals potential safety issues) and whether to proceed to the next station before stopping the train. One difficulty with any amendment to the current emergency alarm system in Auckland's current rail carriages (for example, by adopting an alarm system that does not activate the brakes of the train) is that there is no ability for the train driver to view the carriage affected in order to make an assessment whether to stop the train. This problem will be addressed once the new rolling stock is commissioned for Auckland.

- 10.16 The offer of free travel to Rugby World Cup ticketholders limited to the 3 hour period prior to the opening ceremony had the unintended effect of concentrating public transport travel within a confined period. Although extending the free travel period to 12 hours might flatten the peak, there is of course the risk that this might cause unanticipated peaks at other times whereas, at least for the 3 hour window, there is an opportunity to adjust the timetable to cope in that period with more intensive use.
- 10.17 Advice from some passengers was that details of additional services/rescheduling did not appear on the Auckland Transport website. Publication of this information would obviously assist in diverting some passengers away from the concentration of scheduled services.

## 11 Conclusion

- 11.1 Although there was an unfortunate confluence of factors which contributed to the public transport difficulties in Auckland on 9 September, the greatest single contribution surrounded the difficulty for the event organisers in estimating the number of people likely to attend the waterfront party. Regardless of how capable the programming, timetabling and trial runs may have been, none of this planning could survive the actual number of 200,000 people who are believed to have attended.
- 11.2 Logic would suggest that a city's public transport system and its capacity is designed to cope with the population of that city. Based on this assumption, the inherent capacity of Auckland's public transport system is designed to meet the needs of a population of approximately 1.35 million residents (in the Auckland metropolitan area). It is axiomatic, therefore, that 200,000 people attending a celebration at Auckland's waterfront would have a greater impact on Auckland than it would on a much larger city, such as Sydney. That is simply because the inherent capacity of the public transport system in a smaller city is going to be much less than in a city of say, 5 million people. It was inevitable that numbers in the vicinity of 200,000 people would cause many issues with public transport in the Auckland region. Had anyone predicted a crowd of that size, a different combination of transport solutions could have been identified.
- 11.3 Those services which had capacity built into their scheduling and transport modes and which, by their very nature, were flexible, coped on the whole, surprisingly well. To this extent the ferries and buses subject to some limited exceptions, managed to meet demand for those services albeit with delays for some passengers. The ferries had the flexibility to redirect larger vessels to the areas where peaks were developing, such as Devonport. Similarly buses which might have been scheduled for later in the evening were able to be deployed earlier.
- 11.4 However, when problems arose on the rail network, the finite capacity and fixed nature of the rail system made it inherently difficult to rectify problems once they developed. Many of those problems arose from outside influences, well beyond the control of Veolia and included people walking on the tracks and maliciously activating the emergency stop procedures. Unfortunately once this happened on just one train, the ripple effect was out of proportion to the cause. When there were people on the tracks all other trains, in both directions, were forced to stop as walking on the tracks constitutes notification of a dangerous event. Similarly when the emergency notification had been activated it had to be investigated and the train "reset", costing at least ten to fifteen minutes. With significant numbers trying to board trains, the carriages became crammed with passengers in relatively elderly rolling stock, not designed to cope with such numbers. Delays meant that passengers, many of whom were dressed in warm clothing for the rugby that evening, experienced hot, stuffy, and for some, claustrophobic conditions. Many later emerged distressed. In desperation for fresh air, some passengers then activated the emergency notification and the process and incumbent delays were of course repeated. Every time this happened there was a domino effect of consequent delays for other trains.
- 11.5 While the easy answer to many of these issues is simply to say that more buses, trains and ferries should have been allocated, the practical reality is quite different. A consistent theme from the providers of the transport services was that, for good commercial reasons, the existing transport vehicles (buses, ferries and trains) are already heavily utilised. While

there may be excess passenger capacity which can be used for large events, it is an unrealistic expectation that providers of services would simply have extra trains, buses and ferries sitting idle waiting for the occasional one-off event. In particular, on 9 September, Veolia utilised every carriage that it had available.

- 11.6 While it always might have been challenging to accommodate all the public transport demands, a better understanding and estimate of numbers likely to attend downtown Auckland would have allowed a better allocation of the existing resources, that is, trains, buses and ferries. In particular there might have been an opportunity to adjust standard timetables for suburban services thereby freeing up capacity to cope with anticipated peaks.
- 11.7 Veolia's representatives told me that, given sufficient notice and a request to do so, they could have treated the waterfront celebrations as a special event and made the necessary arrangements for that, in addition to the arrangements made for the game at Eden Park, (however, with all the trains available and being fully utilised it would surely still have been a challenge). Instead, the brief from Auckland Transport, prepared in consultation with Veolia, was to run normal services in and out of Britomart Station (plus special event services to Eden Park), on the day, and, with the benefit of hindsight, this contributed to the problems that Veolia had to deal with using limited resources. This is primarily because, as I understand it, no special arrangements were made for inbound services, and no extra staff were deployed either on board the trains or at stations. Veolia has stated that all available Veolia staff had already been deployed elsewhere, with Auckland Transport's approval. I emphasise however that the decision to run normal services was based on Auckland Transport's expectation that there would be surplus capacity existing on trains returning to the city after an earlier than usual rush hour. In addition there was an underestimation by event organisers as to the numbers expected to attend the waterfront celebrations, including the numbers expected to travel to the celebrations by train – on the southern line in particular. Had the numbers been in line with Auckland Transport's predictions, which were double those of the event organisers, it seems clear that there would have been sufficient capacity to cope with that prediction.
- 11.8 I note from the Kiwirail report that there were significant delays at Britomart Transport Centre post-match, and that it took until well into Saturday morning to clear the number of people wishing to return home by train. Because of the short time available to me to complete this report I have not conducted any particular investigation into the reason for these delays, but I believe I am safe in assuming that, given that an estimated 26,000 people were transported into the city by train that afternoon and evening, the delays were caused partly by the sheer number of people wishing to use the trains, and partly by the disruption to timetables caused by the delays to train services around the network earlier in the day. It should be noted, however, that despite the problems which it encountered earlier in the day, Veolia still managed to clear all Eden Park passengers within the 70 minutes (post-match) as required by Auckland Transport.
- 11.9 Many of the incidents that caused delays to rail services on 9 September 2011 involved potential risks to the health and safety of passengers and members of the public. The health and safety obligations of Veolia as a rail operator (statutory, contractual and pursuant to Veolia's safety case as approved by the Rail Safety Regulator, the New Zealand Transport Agency) are necessarily stringent. I understand that the series of health and safety incidents that occurred on the Auckland rail network on 9 September were required to be, and were in the event, dealt with in accordance with Veolia's health and safety procedures.

- 11.10 The actions of passengers in walking on the railway tracks (after alighting the trains between stations) caused all trains within the vicinity to be stopped until it had been established that the line was clear, causing further delays for the rail network. While the frustration experienced by passengers on the trains was understandable (particularly in the absence of communication as to the reasons for the delays), the actions of passengers in both pressing emergency buttons and walking on the tracks had significant implications, compounding the mounting delays on the rail network.
- 11.11 To the extent that delays on the rail network are related to Veolia's responses to health and safety incidents, it appears that there may be little that can be done to avoid them, as public safety interests must be paramount. It follows that, if similar health and safety incidents were to occur on the railways on days of future games, there may once again be consequent delays for the rail network.
- 11.12 From my Inquiry it is clear that an enormous effort was invested in the planning for this event, not just on paper, but also in practice including using other events such as the Bledisloe Cup match at Eden Park as a trial run; one which was largely successful.
- 11.13 While the circumstances of 9 September are unlikely to be repeated, the events of that day serve as a warning for the planning of transport for the Rugby World Cup semi finals and finals. The planning indicates that Auckland's public transport system is able to cope with the anticipated demand but if it is faced with similar numbers to those attracted to Downtown Auckland on September 9, the risk exists that similar issues could arise. Limiting the numbers of people attending the celebrations in Downtown Auckland could significantly ameliorate the issue.
- 11.14 Finally, my role was to undertake an independent Inquiry into the performance of the public transport system on Friday 9 September. I hope that in the context of this report it will not be forgotten that most people in Downtown Auckland that night enjoyed the exciting and buoyant atmosphere along with superb entertainment; the result being an outstanding celebration to recognise the launch of the Rugby World Cup.

## **Appendices**

### **Appendix I**

**(ATEED's Issues and Action Plans)**

ATEED's review has identified the following key issues and action plan:

Issue	Actions
The site footprint expansion plan for the waterfront didn't work, with the failure of two big screens on the eastern end pushing the crowds west	Big screens tested in situ, crowds restricted until operation confirmed
Impact on Ferry Terminal operations	Enhanced protection of egress pathways from the ferry terminal
Inadequate number of portaloos and rubbish receptacles	Increased provision of toilets, cleaning and signage throughout Quay St and adjoining areas
Queens Wharf numbers not restricted due to no ticketing of this area	Expansion onto Captain Cook Wharf if required
Number of people all coming into the waterfront area exceeds capacity	Considering opening regional fanzones earlier than the quarter-finals weekend, and activation of Silo Park as an additional fanzone space

**Appendix II**  
**(Auckland Transport's Action Plan)**



## ACTION PLAN

The following actions are being implemented for future matches

Action	
<b>Emergency Stop Button (ESB)</b>	
ESB1	One security staff per carriage to deter Emergency Button activation - priority for all Special Event trains then all services from 1pm onwards
<b>Security, Safety &amp; Prevention of Overcrowding</b>	
SSPO1	Enhanced security at Britomart (100 staff previously 60).
SSPO2	Britomart internal corralling and crowd management - review holding, loading and unloading processes to improve loading times (have customer on platform ready to load)
SSPO3	Britomart external (Queen St) enhanced corralling management and PA system; AT 'site manager' linked to AT communications management system and Veolia operations management system
SSPO4	Britomart external (Takutai Sq) enhanced corralling management and PA system; AT 'site manager' linked to AT communications management system and Veolia operations management system
SSPO5	Peripheral platform loadings and crowd management, 1 'station manager' to have presence and also manage crowd flow if necessary; similar to after U2 at Penrose. Also can be contact with CCR (Veolia control Room) and direct crowds to scheduled services or 'order' contingency if disruption
SSPO6	Police: input and review rail security proposals; request a presence on all trains (to step on and off also at each stop)
SSPO7	Level-crossings between Eden Park & Britomart: security presence
<b>Communications</b>	
Comms1	Confirm chain of command and responsibilities across comms incl. potential new Communications Management Layer with linked comms across Veolia and MAXX channels. Improved linkages between Veolia comms, MAXX, MAXX CCR and MEOC on messages
Comms2	Separate on-board announcer additional to Train Manager (TM) with wireless or stood by microphone to make announcements across all services
Comms3	1-on-1 briefing of all TMs this week on announcements
Comms4	Veolia CCR Communications Supervisor to remain at post and manage comms, incl communicating specific station and train messages for station PA, on-board txt and MAXX general channels
Comms5	MAXX Communications Supervisor in CCR alongside Veolia Communications Supervisor to receive information and manage MAXX communication channels (Contact Centre, Website, Ambassadors). Chain of command of comms to MAXX Ambassadors through this role.
Comms6	Real-time updates on MAXX website from in-CCR MAXX Communications Supervisor - advertise in advance. Use for redirection to scheduled services, etc.
Comms7	Monitor Twitter for issues and use to post messages (assistant to MAXX Communications Supervisor in CCR)
Comms8	More (20) MAXX Ambassadors outside Britomart, at Newmarket - incl. information on local scheduled services, taxi ranks, etc.
Comms9	Ensure on-board automated messaging operating
Comms10	On-board communications to include warning that use of emergency stop button should only be used in emergency and will bring the train to a stop preventing quick travel to next station
<b>On-board Environment</b>	
OBE1	Dedicated resource and processes to check that air-conditioning working and set to lowest at Westfield and Bmart
OBE2	Loading policy: limit loads at Britomart and direct excess loads to new Downtown to EP bus service
OBE3	Loading policy: limit loads on peripheral stations on each rail line and direct excess loads to strategically positioned bus service(s) - link to Bus Services action 1 below
<b>Operational contingency Response Management</b>	
OCRM1	Bus Contingency Plan confirmed, incl. priority of pick-up excess rail passengers linked to new limited loading policy.
<b>Bus Services</b>	
Bus1	Increase bus service contingency (emergency response) for each line to cover stranded train (located at stations): 30
Bus2	Bus services from rail stations to EP (or CBD) located at stations: 40 buses
Bus3	100 additional buses : New Downtown to EP bus service (50 to 60 buses) - to cover for Britomart rail excess load from new loading policy plus additional passenger volume contingency
Bus4	Management and corralling (esp. split between scheduled CBD and special EP services) at Busway stations

## **Appendix III**

**(Action Plan including Veolia)**

RWC2011 Action List (16 - 18 Sep)

V3: Word 1	Also	Status	Lead	A Management Oversight
<b>Emergency Stop Button (ESB)</b>				
ESB1	One security staff per train carriage to deter Emergency Button activation - 110 wardens from 15:00 Saturday for 113 carriages. Friday = 19:00 to end of service, 1 or 2 per train. All have mobile phones with Supervisor based at Britomart.	12/8: AT instructed VTAK to progress. 13/8: VTAK confirmed. 14/8: 110 wardens for deployment from 15:00 on all RWC special trains on Saturday. 16/8 Confirmed all covers have been repaired/replaced.	Veolia (Steve W)	Gareth W
ESB2	Damaged ESBs fixed for Friday		Veolia (Steve W)	
<b>Security, Safety &amp; Prevention of Overcrowding</b>				
SSPO1	Enhanced security at Britomart (100 staff).	13/8: Ray confirmed.	Ray S	Bruce B
SSPO2	Britomart internal corralling and crowd management - review holding, loading and unloading processes to improve loading times (have customer on platform ready to load). No changes confirmed by veolia. Contingency to be available on Friday	13/8: meeting between AT and VTAK to be held. 15/8: VTAK/AT meeting As discussed on 15/8 in order to manage the fire safety regulations at Britomart and maintain a safe operation we will preload platforms only when there is no conflict with an incoming train. 14/8: AT internal meeting. Ray progressing. 15/8: Being actioned. Site Manager to liaise with Veolia.	Veolia (Craig I) / Ray S (Gareth W support)	Bruce B
SSPO3	Britomart external West (Queen St) SITE MANAGEMENT; corralling, PA system, IMAXX Ambassadors, security, comms link to AT communications management system and Veolia operations management system; AT appointed Site Manager. Contingency to be available on Friday.	14/8: AT internal meeting. Ray progressing. 15/8: Being actioned. Site Manager to liaise with Veolia.	Ray S (Gareth W support)	Bruce B
SSPO4	Britomart external East (Takutai Sq) SITE MANAGEMENT; corralling, PA system, IMAXX Ambassadors, security, comms link to AT communications management system and Veolia operations management system; AT appointed Site Manager. Contingency to be available on Friday.	14/8: AT internal meeting. Ray progressing. 15/8: being actioned - Site Manager to liaise with Veolia.	Ray S (Gareth W support)	Bruce B
SSPO5	Security presence at all rail stations. Also perform platform loadings and crowd management (if required); link to Veolia communications to receive loading, crowding and bus contingency instructions and then direct passengers. Veolia staff in MCR to lead and coordinate bus contingency and security presence, including PA.	13/8: VTAK meeting - VTAK to liaise with Ray on comms linkages. 14/8: AT meeting, security 50 personnel confirmed. 15/8: Action confirmed. 60 security staff at stations Fri & Sat	Ray S (Gareth W support) + Veolia (Steve W)	Bruce B
SSPO5	Police: input and review rail security proposals, plan to include presence on trains and at stations (to step on and off, also at each stop)	Meeting with Brett England held. Policing units will travel on trains to CBD and to Eden Park. 75 police at Britomart on rolling shifts to be deployed as necessary. No capacity to have police based at outer stations but will deploy as needed (eg attended Newmarket incident on Friday). Will also review PT security arrangements.	Fergus G	David W
SSPO7	All main public access points between Eden Park and Britomart to have security presence (incl. all level crossings, pedestrian crossings and tunnel entrance and exits)	14/8: not spot sites identified, resource requirement confirmed, coverage and deployment to be finalised (together with contact details). 15/8: Being actioned. 15/8 Teleconference between AT, Veolia, KRN.	Ray S and Gareth W	Bruce B
SSPO8	Review Britomart eastern escalator operator.	Staff member to be located to monitor & control escalator operation	Ray S	Bruce B
SSPO9	Raise with St John's additional resource in Britomart		Bruce B	Bruce B
SSP10	SCR to monitor stations for crowding and "challenging" and raise issues	All in place; half hourly report to be provided to MEOC	Ray S	Gareth W
<b>Communications</b>				
Comms1	Communications plan to identify full range of options (car, PT, walking, taxi) available for travel to the games and Downtown Fanzone	Incorporated in AT advertising	Wally T	David W
Comms2	Confirm chain of command and responsibilities across customer comms incl. potential new Communications Management Layer with linked comms across VTAK and IMAXX channels. Improved linkages between Veolia comms, IMAXX, IMAXX CCR and MEOC on messages	14/8: internal AT meeting. 13/8: M Lambert, L Elliot, and B Barnard met, and agreed Customer Comms responsibilities via Veolia CCR, and MEOC information flow. LE, ML, and BB will need to meet again 15/09 to confirm and nail down final responsibilities. 15/8: Completed	Lorraine E & Mark L	Bruce B

RWC2011 Action List (16 - 18 Sep)

Comms3	Separate on-board announcer to TM with wireless or stood by microphone to make announcements; will need mobile phone to receive specific texts - separate from crowd to avoid intimidation. Across all services. Use on Friday where possible with scripts and get TMs to communicate and utilize for PA.	*	13/9: VTAK confirm progressing. On Board Announcers currently being recruited, met with SW Veolia, training over 2 sessions Friday 16th Sept, Murray N and Abi Valls, to attend as well. Announcers to go live Saturday. Outside Britomart announcers to go live Friday pending PA system being set up. 14/9: Lorraine sourcing 20 people, training planned and in place for Friday. 16/9: For Friday we will cover as many SA services with announcing staff as possible, concentrating on services arriving into Britomart before the events.	Lorraine E (recruit) & Steve W (manage)	Mark L
Comms4	i-on-1 briefing of all TMs this week on announcements	*	12/9: VTAK progressing 14/9: TM briefings co-ordinating and completed by Friday. 15/9: complete.	Veolia (Craig I)	Gareth W
Comms5	VTAK CCR Communications Supervisor to remain at post and manage comms, incl communicating specific station and train messages for station PA, on-board bt and MAXX general channels	*	12/9: VTAK progressing. 15/9: complete 15/9: 25 radios to be provided by Veolia supplier confirmed for tomorrow pm	Veolia (Craig I)	Gareth W
Comms6	Do VTAK need resources in CCR to map service delays against schedule, creating specific service messages and tracking TM / on-board comms staff locations?	*	13/9: VTAK advise will review, AT offered staff. Will confirm by COB today 15/9	Veolia (Craig I)	Mark L
Comms7	MAXX Communications Supervisor in CCR alongside Veolia Communications Supervisor to receive information and manage MAXX communication channels (Contact Centre, Website, Ambassadors). Chain of command of comms to MAXX Ambassadors through this role.	*	12/9: AT progressing. 13/9: Actioned. Customer Services and Veolia have met and agreed	Lorraine E	Bruce B
Comms8	Real-time updates on MAXX website from in-CCR MAXX Communications Supervisor - advise in advance. Use for redirection to scheduled services, etc.	*	14/9: progressing. Documenting workflow. Process in hand.	Lorraine E	Bruce B
Comms9	Monitor social media for issues and use to post messages (assistant to MAXX Communications Supervisor in CCR)	*	14/9: progressing. Risk of conflict on rates and responsibilities with Comms. Need to clarify roles with Comms.	Lorraine E	Bruce B
Comms10	More (10 to 20) MAXX Ambassadors outside Britomart for Downtown closure and PT moves	*	Completed - 20+ available	Lorraine E / Rob P / Kate M	Bruce B
Comms11	Ensure on-board automated messaging operating	*	13/9: VTAK confirmed	Veolia (Steve W)	Gareth W
Comms12	Scripts for on-train PA; to also include warning that use of emergency stop button should only be used in emergency and will bring the train to a stop preventing quick travel to next station	*	13/9: VTAK agreed 14/9: Currently preparing	Veolia (Steve W)	Gareth W
Comms13	PT Ops establish BAU service operations management team to work alongside MEOC including PT facilities Site Management teams	*	14/9: commenced. Service operations team BAU team established. Downtown Manager - Kate Maris. Bus network managers Terry Darvill / Andy Maule. Ferry network manager - Chitsline Mulford.	Colin H	Mark L
Comms14	MAXX Ambassadors to be plugged into Operations Site Management Teams	*	14/9: progressing. 15/9: Completed. Maxx ambassadors in place. Direct messaging from MEOC to MAXX supervisors.	Lorraine E (Ray S, Anthony B, John J, Colin H)	Mark L
Comms15	Improved communication material for MAXX Ambassadors for PT moves as result of road closure	*	15/9: Done - briefing packs	Pierre H	Mark L
Comms16	Improved communication on MAXX web for Downtown closure and PT moves	*	14/9: progressing. 15/9: downtown closure & bus stop changes on MAXX website	Pierre H	Mark L
Comms17	Britomart KoiXor coverage to be implemented for Friday	*	Being done evening 15/9	Ray S	
On-board Environment					
OBE1	Dedicated resource and processes to check that air-conditioning working and set to lowest at Westfield and Bmart	*	12/9: VTAK progressing 15/9: completed. Request sent to Paul Ashton to be included as fill for service checks in morning of match. 15/9: VTAK HO staff to do	Veolia (Craig I)	Ken M
OBE2	Loading policy: limit loads at Britomart and direct excess loads to new Downtown to EP bus service	*	15/9: Completed - require confirmed security arrangement	Veolia (Graham S)	Gareth W
OBE3	Loading policy: limit loads on peripheral stations on each rail line and direct excess loads to strategically positioned bus service(s) - link to Bus Services action 1 below	*	15/9: Completed - Security staff at all stations	Veolia (Graham S)	Gareth W
Operational Contingency Response Management					
OCRM1	AT observation, trouble shooting management: FG, ML, CH, GW	*	In place	Fergus G / Mark L	
OCRM2	If line blockage, move train to next station and arrange urgently contingency buses ASAP	*	15/9: Completed	Veolia (Craig I)	Gareth W
OCRM3	Bus Contingency Plan confirmed, incl. priority of pick-up excess rail passengers linked to new limited loading policy. Saturday priority - to get people to Eden Park if major issues.	*	15/9: Completed	Veolia (Graham S)	Bruce B
OCRM4	Bus stop	*			
OCRM5	Additional KRS network infrastructure and train contingency response team for non-game days	*	16/9: Paul Ashton confirmed emergency response team will be available at Britomart tonight.	Gareth W / Steve W	Mark L
Bus Services					

RWC2011 Action List (16 - 18 Sep)

Bus1	Increase bus service contingency (emergency response) for each line to cover stranded train (located at stations): 34 buses under Veolia control. (For Friday, possible 3 extra trains egress etc)		12/9: VTAK progressing 15/9: Completed. 34 buses confirmed	Veolia (Craig I)	Bruce B
Bus2	Bus services from rail stations to EP or CBD located at stations.		14/9: additional buses sourced by RWC Team to allow utilisation of NZ Bus resource as BAU contingency; allocation of operator and number of buses to agreed location to be finalised; railbus stop locations and proposed layover positions agreed; process for dispatch and on-site management to be finalised between Veolia and PT Ops.	Veolia (Craig I)	Bruce B
Bus3	New Downtown to EP bus shuttle (100) - to cover for Britomart rail excess load from new loading policy - Bus Stop D14715		12/9: NZ Bus instructed. Service specification under development. 14/9: Railbus stop locations and proposed layover positions agreed; agreed that management of operation is RWC Team's responsibility	Greg H & Shelley S	Bruce B
Bus4	VTAK and AT management of above 100 bus contingency, customer communications and corraling between Britomart and bus contingency		14/9: Agreed that Veolia will manage provision of overflow contingency buses; process to be finalised as to identification of need to use and dispatch; customer communication to be through security personnel deployed at stations and by use of PA. Collateral to be produced to assist in direction of customers to BRT stops, security staff to be deployed to new Downtown to EP bus service and along bus layover sites. All in hand	Gareth W, Roy S, Veolia (Steve W)	Bruce B
Bus5	Silverdale & Whangaparaoa shuttle to Albany		13/9: planning commenced	Greg H & Shelley S	Bruce B
Bus6	Management and corraling (esp. spill between scheduled CBD and special EP services) at Busway stations		14/9: progressing Urban Bus changes confirmed. Passenger information on track 15/9: Riaks & mitigation. Confirming outpound and on-call coverage across weekend. Plan in place awaiting feedback from Ritchies. 15/9: Additional security procured and staffing increased for both nights. Plan is easily scaleable if crowds less than anticipated. 16/9 : ready to go. Along with improvements identified by busway team debrief	Greg H & Shelley S Antony B & Allen B	Mark L
Bus7	Downtown closure management for PT services operations moves and customer communications		13/9: planning commenced. 15/9 Completed Underway	Kate M Angus D	Mark L
Bus8	JTOC traffic management - keep in loop on planning		16/9: Additional NEX services. 2 additional UE buses and bankered services for Blakenhead and H&E.	Colin H	Bruce B
Bus 9	Additional BAU bus and ferry services for a Friday		NZB will operate inbound services in the pm as live services.		Mark L
Bus 10	Additional BAU bus and ferry services for a Saturday		16/9: 40 NZB (15city, 10 Roskill, 15 other depots) to be on standby and inserted as required. UE 2 additional buses on Fri & Sat. RTH 5 minute NEX at peak times on both days and other services bolstered. Additional services on Blakenhead Transport. Additional ferry services organised. details coming	Colin H	Mark L
Traffic Management Plans					
TMP1	Review event TMPs to ensure contingency for increased private vehicle use, including parking provision and safe walking access		Gap/Risk analysis and mitigation development underway	John Strawbridge	Bruce B
TMP2	Ensure close liaison with event organisers around likely crowd numbers and contingency plans		Receiving advice from ATEED on likely crowds over remainder of tournament.	John Strawbridge	Bruce B

## **Appendix IV**

**(List of rail incident reports)**

Incident Number	Date	Time	Short Title	Location 1	Location 2	Location	Description
113821	09/09/2011	13:44	3137 near collision with person Greenlane Road	NAL - NAL NORTH AUCKLAND LINE	GREENLANE	3 5.99	3137 near collision with person Greenlane Road - LE reported 20yo male appear from under bridge near hit ar train approached platform. Police advised at attended.
113823	09/09/2011	14:19	Pax collapsed on train 1038	NAL - NAL NORTH AUCKLAND LINE	NEWMARKET	8.42	Pax collapsed on train 1038 at Newmarket. Ambulance called and passenger alighted onto platform to wait assistances.
113825	09/09/2011	15:03	8131 pax attempted to board when train leaving	NAL - NAL NORTH AUCKLAND LINE	HENDERSON	26.65	8131 pax attempted to board when train leaving- LE reported delay at Henderson due to passenger trying to board after doors closed. Passenger let on. No inquiry reported.
113826	09/09/2011	15:09	2243 reports kids playing chicken	NIMT - NORTH ISLAND MAIN TRUNK	TE MAHIA PED	652.32	2243 reports kids playing chicken at te Mahia Ped xing. Police advised.
113828	09/09/2011	15:40	3148 passenger fainted on board	NIMT - NORTH ISLAND MAIN TRUNK	MIDDLEMORE	662.28	3148 passenger fainted on board due to crowding. Passenger alighted at Middlemore to Hosp. Amb advised by TC. Train delayed 12"
113830	09/09/2011	16:20	2248 emergency brake activated	NIMT - NORTH ISLAND MAIN TRUNK	PANMURE	670.41	2248 emergency brake activated at Panmure. LE investigated and re-set. No emergency.
113831	09/09/2011	16:50	Hiding on rear outside of train 5240	NIMT - NORTH ISLAND MAIN TRUNK	MEADOWBANK (AUCK)	676.26	Hiding on rear outside of train 5240. CCTV reported 2 persons riding on outside rear loco on 5240 ex Glen Innes. Train stopped meadowbank to check and Police called.
113836	09/09/2011	17:45	W118 demerGENCY brake and pass out doors	NAL - NAL NORTH AUCKLAND LINE	NEWMARKET	8.42	W118 demerGENCY brake and pass out doors. While train delayed waiting berth at Newmarket (due to Britomart congestion) passengers operated multiple stop buttons and self evacuated from train on to track. Second train used to tranship after significant del
113859	09/09/2011	17:50	Trains stopped for trespassers @ Parnell	NWMKT - NEWMARKET AUCKLAND LINE NW	Parnell Rise	2.017	Trains stopped for trespassers @ Parnell after report of multiple persons walking on track. Services resumed with caution after 10"
113832	09/09/2011	17:53	Veolia service 3254 delayed at Auckland Station	NIMT - NORTH ISLAND MAIN TRUNK	AUCKLAND STATION	681.827	Veolia service 3254 at Auckland Station detained for approx 15", disgruntled passengers forced doors open and started detaining on to the tracks. Lines closed in & out of Britomart with imminent rioting behavior. Police clearance at 18:00hrs
113833	09/09/2011	18:28	Emergency stop activated on W837 Nth of Parnell	NWMKT - NEWMARKET AUCKLAND LINE NW	Parnell	0.668	Emergency stop activated on W837 Nth of Parnell Tunnel, Unknown number of passengers disembarked. Crew had difficulties getting through train to reset emergency device.
113853	09/09/2011	18:25	Fighting on Train W937 Avondale	NAL - NAL NORTH AUCKLAND LINE	AVONDALE (NI)	17.23	Fighting on Train W937 Avondale - Police attended. Train held 20"
113837	09/09/2011	18:30	W128 passengers self evacuated	NAL - NAL NORTH AUCKLAND LINE		6.4	W128 passengers self evacuated after train detained between Greenlane and Remuera due to 2 other services disabled by emergency brakes. Rail staff and emergency services assisted controlled evacuation of all passengers.
113854	09/09/2011	20:00	Fire extinguisher discharged	NAL - NAL NORTH AUCKLAND LINE	KINGSLAND	11.94	Fire extinguisher discharged on train at Kingsland. Passengers needed to be evacuated while powder cleared.
113834	09/09/2011	20:10	6136 fighting on train Sylvia Park	NIMT - NORTH ISLAND MAIN TRUNK	SYLVIA PARK	668.36	6136 fighting on train Sylvia Park - train stopped at station while police attended
113855	09/09/2011	21:05	Barrier mechanism broken Mays Rd	ONHGA - ONEHUNGA INDUSTRIAL LINE	MAYS ROAD LX	1.63	Barrier mechanism broken Mays Rd due to vandalism. Reported to Maintainers that people had been seen swinging on the arm. Signals unable to repair immediately due to replacement part not available. 10km/h TSR applied.

113835	09/09/2011	22:31	Female fell from platform on to track Otahuhu	NIMT - NORTH ISLAND MAIN TRUNK	OTAHUHU	664.15	Female fell from platform on to track Otahuhu - reported by passing empty train. Possible intoxication and injuries sustained. Ambulance called.
113838	10/09/2011	0:18	Fighting causing injury to passenger on Veolia 2274	NIMT - NORTH ISLAND MAIN TRUNK	AUCKLAND STATION	681.827	Fighting causing injury to passenger on Veolia service 2274, Service continued to Britomart to meet emergency services